[Remops] Generating a stronger PGP key?

[lists at notatla.org.uk]

> > (http://www.nsa.gov/business/programs/elliptic_curve.shtml) If
> > that's so some tradeoff between budget and time almost certainly 
> > brings keys of this size into range for cracking - e.g. spend
> > $250M and crack a key every 16 days.
> > 
> > One remailer private key reveals many messages.

> The interception of a complete message is still safe IMO. Please
> remember that if a Mixmaster packet is intercepted in route and
> decrypted, it's still just a packet of data. Mixmaster breaks messages
> apart into packets that are sent through various random remailer paths
> and are assembled at the end-node. It's not perfect but it does
> introduce a layer of complexity where the end-node would have to be
> compromised in order to collect the entire message.

If the 10 most popular remailers have their keys broken in 160 days
that's pretty damaging IMO as a high proportion of messages are exposed.
We now have 20-odd mixmaster remailers and some of them don't even have
expiry dates on their keys.  Against big-budget agencies I suspect
1024-bits has become useless.